Abstract An error decodable secret-sharing scheme is a secret-sharing scheme with the additional property that the secret can be recovered from the set of all shares, even after a coalition of participants corrupts the shares they possess. In this paper, schemes that can tolerate corruption by sets of participants belonging to a monotone coalition structure are considered. This coalition structure may be unrelated to the authorised sets of the secret-sharing scheme. This is generalisation of both a related notion studied in the context of multiparty computation, and the well-known error-correction properties of threshold schemes based on Reed-Solomon codes. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such schemes are deduced, and methods for reducing the storage requirements of a technique of Kurosawa for constructing error-decodable secret-sharing schemes with efficient decoding algorithms are demonstrated. In addition, the connection between one-round perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) schemes with general adversary structures and secret-sharing schemes is explored. We prove a theorem that explicitly shows the relation between these structures. In particular, an error decodable secret-sharing scheme yields a one-round PSMT, but the converse does not hold. Furthermore, we Commun. (2011) 3:65-86 are able to show that some well-known results concerning one-round PSMT follow from known results on secret-sharing schemes. These connections are exploited to investigate factors affecting the performance of one-round PSMT schemes such as the number of channels required, the communication overhead, and the efficiency of message recovery.
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Introduction
A secret-sharing scheme takes a secret value and distributes related data (known as shares) to a set of participants so as to permit certain specified subsets of the participants to recover the secret, while preventing all other subsets from learning any information about the secret. Proposed independently in 1979 by Blakley [3] and Shamir [28] , the original models considered adversaries that were passive in the sense that while they might attempt to learn the secret, they would not otherwise interfere with the functioning of the scheme. In addition, the earliest schemes were constructed for classes of adversaries that are defined by a threshold value: any set of k or more participants is considered to be authorised to recover the secret, whereas a set of k − 1 or fewer participants is deemed to be an adversarial coalition that should not be allowed to learn any information about the secret. Secret-sharing schemes secure against passive adversary structures defined by more general collections of subsets have received considerable attention (e.g. [17] ).
Secret-sharing schemes have also been investigated for a number of different adversary models. Robust secret-sharing schemes allow the correct secret to be recovered even when some of the shares presented during an attempted reconstruction are incorrect. A framework for considering robust secret sharing is provided in [1] , which includes schemes in both the information-theoretic and computationally secure settings. Secret-sharing schemes that either detect or identify participants who present incorrect shares during an attempted recovery have also been extensively studied, for example [21, 25, 26] . While such schemes make it apparent that cheating has occurred, they do not necessarily permit honest participants to recover the correct secret. Verifiable secret-sharing schemes have been proposed for environments where the shares given to participants may not be correct (the "dealer" of these shares may be corrupt), for example [6, 7] . These typically involve protocols that can be performed by various subsets of participants in order to check that the shares they possess are consistent in some sense. An overview of different secret-sharing adversary models can be found in [22] .
In this paper we consider a type of information-theoretically secure robust secretsharing scheme. There are two general approaches that can be taken in order to build such "robustness" into an information-theoretically secure secret-sharing scheme. The first approach involves issuing shares that contain additional information so that they can be "verified" in some way. This approach is taken by informationtheoretically secure verifiable secret sharing schemes, as well as many of the secretsharing schemes with error detection and correction capability. The second approach is to require additional shares, above and beyond what is strictly required to reconstruct the secret, in order to perform error correction [24, 27, 29, 30] . This is also the approach adopted by the error decodable secret-sharing schemes proposed by Kurosawa [20] .
A secret-sharing scheme secure against an adversary is said to be error decodable if it is still possible to recover the correct secret from the set of all shares even if the shares possessed by an adversarial subset are corrupted. Such schemes have previously been considered in the case of threshold adversaries [24, 27, 29, 30] as well as non-threshold adversaries [8, 11, 20] . It is shown in the above papers that the question of whether or not a scheme is error decodable depends only on the properties of the adversary structure considered; for appropriate adversaries, the error-decoding ability essentially comes for free. What is not guaranteed, however, is an efficient algorithm for performing the decoding. In light of this, Kurosawa proposes a technique for converting any linear error decodable secret sharing scheme into one in which the decoding can be performed efficiently, at the cost of considerably increasing the size of the shares [20] .
An algorithm for efficient decoding of certain error decodable secret-sharing schemes was proposed by Cramer et al. [8] , but it only applies to secret-sharing schemes that are strongly multiplicative. Strong multiplicativity is a property required for some multiparty computation applications, and in general it is not known which access structures admit an efficient construction of a strongly multiplicative secret-sharing scheme. Shamir's secret sharing scheme is one example of a strongly multiplicative secret-sharing scheme; in fact, most known constructions of strongly multiplicative secret-sharing schemes arise from error correcting codes for which there exist efficient decoding techniques (for example, [5, 32] ).
The notion of a share-hiding error-correcting secret sharing scheme was proposed by Ye, Steinfeld, Pieprzyk and Wang for an application in fuzzy private matching [31] . They consider a t-out-of-n threshold scheme where up to n − t shares are replaced by random values, and they describe methods to determine the correct secret with probability close (but not equal) to 1, based on interleaved ReedSolomon codes.
A primitive that turns out to be closely related to error decodable secret sharing is that of one-round perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT). The basic PSMT scenario consists of two users A and B who are connected by a number of distinct channels, some subset of which are controlled by an adversary. User A sends information to B over the channels, and the adversary can eavesdrop on the channels it controls, as well as potentially change the information that reaches B through those channels. A one-round PSMT scheme allows A to send a message to B by transmitting information over each channel in such a way that the adversary learns no information about the message by eavesdropping on the channels it controls, and it cannot prevent B from recovering the message. As in the case for traditional secret sharing, PSMT was originally proposed for threshold adversaries [10] , and has since been generalised (in the one-round case) to more general adversaries [9] .
In this paper we consider both error decodable secret sharing and one-round PSMT in the even more general setting where the possible active and passive adversary coalitions are defined separately. (Such adversarial models have previously been considered in the case of verifiable secret sharing [11] and secure multi-party computation [23] .) We provide background results and definitions relating to secret sharing in Section 2. In Section 3 we formally define error decodable secret sharing, and describe an adversary model that allows us to simultaneously generalise previous notions of error decodable secret sharing, as well as the error correction properties of Reed-Solomon codes. We give necessary and sufficient conditions on the adversary structures for a secret-sharing scheme to be error decodable in this model, analogous to conditions previously given in [9, 10, 14, 20, 23] (for example) for various related primitives.
In Section 4 we consider error-decodable schemes with efficient decoding algorithms. We show that Kurosawa's technique for constructing efficiently-decodable schemes can be applied in this more general setting, and we give techniques for modifying this construction in order to substantially reduce the sizes of the shares.
Section 5 contains an exploration of the precise relationship between one-round PSMT schemes for general adversary structures, and secret-sharing schemes. We describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a one-round PSMT scheme with a general adversary structure, as well as the conditions under which a secret-sharing scheme gives rise to a one-round PSMT scheme. In particular, an error decodable secret-sharing scheme yields a one-round PSMT, but the converse does not hold. Furthermore, we are able to show that some well-known results concerning one-round PSMT follow from known results on secret-sharing schemes. We then consider the performance requirements of one-round PSMT, and we show how our consideration of error decodable schemes leads to a greater understanding of how to construct better one-round PSMT schemes for general adversary structures.
Finally, in Section 6 we specify some open problems in the study of errordecodable secret sharing and one-round PSMT schemes for general adversaries.
Secret sharing
Let S be a set of n entities referred to as participants (for convenience of notation we will identify S with the set {1, 2, . . . , n}). Let P(S) = {A|A ⊆ S} denote the set of all subsets of S. A collection ⊆ P(S) of subsets of S is said to be a monotone access structure if contains all sets A ∈ P(S) satisfying A ⊆ A for some A ∈ . The complement of , denoted c , is the collection of subsets of S that are not in , so c = P(S) \ . The subsets contained in are authorised sets, and subsets contained in c are referred to as unauthorised sets.
Example 1 One widely-studied example of a monotone access structure is a (k, n)-threshold access structure, in which the authorised sets are all subsets of S containing at least k elements, and the unauthorised sets are those containing k − 1 or fewer elements.
Definition 1 A secret-sharing scheme realising an access structure is an algorithm for assigning shares in some secret quantity s to each participant such that any authorised set of participants can use their combined shares to compute s. More formally, a secret-sharing scheme can be defined in terms of two algorithms:
-the share generation algorithm Gen(s, γ ) takes a secret s and randomness γ and outputs a list v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) of shares that are distributed to the n participants in S; -the secret-recovery algorithm Rec takes a list of valid shares corresponding to an authorised set in and outputs the secret s.
Schemes in which each unauthorised set is unable to determine any information about s are said to be perfect.
All further discussion of secret-sharing schemes in this paper is assumed to refer to perfect schemes unless otherwise specified.
It is known to be possible to realise any monotone access structure by a linear secret-sharing scheme [17] : In order to share a secret using a linear secret-sharing scheme, the secret is represented by an element s ∈ GF(q), which is used to construct a secret vector r ∈ GF(q) d by setting r 1 = s then drawing r i randomly from GF(q) for i = 2, 3,
l generated by setting v i = m i · r; participant i is assigned a share consisting of the list {v j |ϕ( j) = i}. If A is an authorised set, then there exist α j ∈ GF(q) such that { j|ϕ( j)∈A} α j m j = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) and then, by construction, { j|ϕ( j)∈A} α j v j = s, hence the participants in A can recover the secret. Thus, for a linear secret-sharing scheme, both Gen and Rec consist solely of linear operations, and can be performed efficiently. It can be shown that for any unauthorised subset B, the participants in B obtain no information about the secret by combining their shares, and hence such schemes are perfect.
Example 2 A linear secret-sharing scheme realising a (k, n)-threshold access structure with n ≤ p and k − 1 < p for some prime p can be constructed from an extended Reed-Solomon code. This is accomplished by taking l = n, defining ϕ(i) = i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and letting M be a subset of
; the value of v p is simply given by r k−1 and the secret s is given by f (0). An authorised set of shares gives the value of f at k or more points; since f has degree at most k − 1 it can be interpolated from those values and the value f (0) recovered. The values of f at a set of k − 1 or fewer points do not affect the likelihood of any element of GF( p) being equal to f (0), and thus an unauthorised set learns no information about s. This scheme was proposed by Shamir in 1979 [28] . We observe that the above description is readily generalised to give schemes with up to q participants defined over GF(q), where q is a power of a prime greater than k − 1.
In the scheme just described, both the secret and each of the shares consists of an element of GF( p), and hence have the same size. More generally, it can be shown that for any perfect secret sharing scheme, the size of each share is at least the size of the secret.
Definition 3
The information rate of a secret-sharing scheme can be defined informally as the ratio of the size of the secret to the size of the largest share. A secretsharing scheme is said to be ideal if the size of each share is the same as the size of the secret, i.e., if it has information rate 1. Thus Shamir's secret-sharing scheme is ideal, as is any linear secret-sharing scheme for which l = n and ϕ is bijective.
Error decodable secret sharing
Whereas secret-sharing schemes are designed to be secure against unauthorised coalitions of participants that wish to learn the secret, an active adversary may still disrupt a scheme by corrupting some of the participants' shares, potentially making it impossible to recover the secret. In fact, it turns out that for appropriate access structures, the corresponding secret-sharing schemes do offer a degree of resistance against such attacks, which leads us to the notion of error decodable secret sharing. We will now examine two notions of error decodability that differ in the nature of the errors that can be corrected, before seeing how we can simultaneously unify and generalise them.
(k, n)-threshold schemes and Reed-Solomon codes
It was observed as early as 1981 that an ideal (k, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme can be interpreted as a Reed-Solomon code [24] .
Definition 4
Let q be a prime power and n a positive integer with n ≤ q + 1. Let α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n be distinct elements of GF(q) ∪ {∞}. Let C be the code of length n over GF(q) defined by setting
where f (∞) is defined to be the coefficient of
Such codes are known to be linear codes with dimension k and minimum distance n − k + 1, which implies they are MDS codes [16] . Consider Shamir's (k, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme. If we take all possible secret vectors r ∈ GF(q) k , then the corresponding share vectors v are precisely the words of an [n, k, n − k + 1] Reed-Solomon code, by construction. Since a ReedSolomon code has minimum distance n − k + 1, then if n − k ≥ 2t it can be used to correct up to t errors. Therefore, given the vector of shares possessed by the participants in a (k, n)-threshold scheme, we can recover the corresponding secret, even if up to t of the participants' shares have been corrupted (i.e., replaced by a different element of GF(q)), provided n − k ≥ 2t [24] . Techniques for performing such error correction for threshold secret-sharing schemes have received a certain amount of attention in the literature [27, 29, 30] .
General error decodable secret-sharing schemes
Error decodable secret-sharing schemes for more general access structures were considered in [8, 11, 20] . We describe the model studied in [8, 20] (a slightly more general model is considered in [11] ). A secret-sharing scheme realising an access structure is error decodable if the secret can be recovered from the set of all participants' (possibly corrupted) shares, provided that the set of all participants whose shares have been corrupted is an unauthorised set. This is expressed more precisely in the following definition:
Definition 5 A secret-sharing scheme is said to be error decodable if the following decoding algorithm always returns the correct secret when given an input consisting of a list of shares t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) that has been corrupted in positions corresponding to the members of an unauthorised set. A secret-sharing scheme realising an access structure is error decodable precisely when the access structure satisfies a condition known as Q 3 [8, 13, 20] . The condition Q 3 was first defined by Hirt and Maurer in the context of secure multiparty computation [15] . [15] A monotone access structure for a set S of participants is said to satisfy property
Algorithm

Definition 6
Example 3 A (k, n)-threshold scheme satisfies property Q 3 if and only if n > 3(k − 1). Equivalently, a (k, n)-threshold scheme is error decodable if and only if n − k ≥ 2(k − 1). This agrees with the fact that an [n, k, n − k + 1] Reed-Solomon code can correct k − 1 errors if and only if n − k ≥ 2(k − 1).
General adversary structures and -error decodable secret-sharing schemes
The case of Reed-Solomon decoding of a (k, n)-threshold scheme involves schemes that can withstand coalitions of size at most n−k 2 of participants who corrupt their shares. The papers [8, 20] considered schemes secure against coalitions of players in c , where is the access structure of the scheme. The paper [13] defined a monotone adversary structure which consists of not necessarily all of the unauthorised sets. We allow an arbitrary monotone adversary structure, i.e., any collection ⊆ P(S) with the property that if B ⊂ B for some B ∈ , then B ∈ . We refer to elements of as coalition sets. Note that c is an example of a monotone adversary structure, as is the collection of subsets of S containing at most t participants.
Definition 7
Let and be a monotone access structure and a monotone adversary structure respectively for a set S of participants. Consider Algorithm 1 with c replaced by in step 1. We say that a secret-sharing scheme realising the access structure is -error decodable if this algorithm always returns the correct secret when given an input consisting of some list of shares output by Gen, but with precisely those shares possessed by the members of some set in having been corrupted. (We will understand the term 'error decodable' to mean -error decodable with = c ; in this case our definition coincides with that of [8, 20] .)
In this scenario, the role played by the condition Q 3 is filled by a variant of this condition, leading to the following theorem. 
i for all i ∈ B (otherwise the shares given to members of B would uniquely determine the secret). Let t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) be the corrupted list of shares defined by
Then t differs from both v 1 and v 2 in positions corresponding to shares possessed by a set belonging to , hence Algorithm 1 returns ⊥. (This is depicted schematically in Fig. 1.) 
Fig. 1 Decoding fails if
Conversely, suppose the scheme is not -error decodable. Then there exists some corrupted list of shares t, and valid lists of shares v 1 and v 2 whose corresponding secrets s 1 and s 2 are not equal, such that W 1 = { j ∈ S|v 1 j = t j } ∈ and W 2 = { j ∈ S|v 2 j = t j } ∈ (so the decoding algorithm outputs ⊥ when given t as input). This approach serves to unify and also generalise some previous results. Kurosawa [20] proved the special case of this result when = c ; note that the condition Q 3 is precisely condition Q( c , c , c ) in our notation. Fehr and Maurer [11] had previously stated a version of this theorem under the assumption that ⊆ c ; however, they did not provide a proof. Furthermore, in the threshold case, we obtain the previously stated result that error decodability is possible when n ≥ k + 2t. Our generalised theorem both allows the consideration of schemes that can withstand more powerful corruption adversaries, as well as permitting potential efficiency gains in scenarios where the adversary is more constrained.
We observe that it is not always necessary to use the entire (corrupted) list of shares in the decoding process, a fact that follows immediately from Theorem 1: 
Efficiently decodable schemes
The decoding technique described in Algorithm 1 serves to determine when error decoding of a secret-sharing scheme is theoretically possible, but it does not represent a practical means of actually carrying out the decoding. Ideally we would like decoding techniques whose running time is polynomial in the number of participants in the scheme. In the case where consists of all subsets of S of size at most t for some positive integer t, then the set of all valid share vectors in an ideal -error decodable secret sharing scheme is an error-correcting code that can correct t errors. For an ideal (k, n)-threshold scheme (e.g., the Shamir scheme), this code is a ReedSolomon code, and thus there are known techniques for performing the decoding in an efficient manner [16] ; however, the problem of decoding a general linear code is known to be NP-complete [2] . Thus for more general error decodable secret sharing schemes there is no guarantee that an efficient decoding technique exists.
Kurosawa has proposed a technique for transforming a linear error decodable secret-sharing scheme into one that can be decoded in time polynomial in l and in the bitlength of q, at the expense of significantly larger share sizes [20] . 1 We will now describe this construction before considering techniques for reducing the storage requirements when addressing more general adversary structures.
4.1 Kurosawa's polynomial-time error decodable scheme Kurosawa proposes a two-level approach for converting an error decodable secretsharing scheme into one that can be decoded in polynomial time. Kurosawa [20] used the notation of a linear secret-sharing scheme, and we present our modified scheme here in the same setting. (M, ϕ) be a linear secret sharing scheme realising a monotone access structure that satisf ies property Q( , , c ).
Scheme 1 Let
The scheme (M, ϕ) is used to generate a share vector v corresponding to a secret s ∈ GF(q). The role of the level 2 shares is essentially to provide an authenticity check for the level 1 shares. As they are assigned using (M, ϕ), it follows that they do not leak any additional information about the level 1 shares to any unauthorised sets. This construction can be applied to any linear error decodable secret sharing scheme, although at the cost of the participants having to store the random elements of the The decoding algorithm of Scheme 1 will have polynomial complexity provided that there is a polynomial-time algorithm to determine membership in . In the setting considered by Kurosawa, it holds that = c , so this test can easily be done for a linear scheme by means of elementary row operations on the matrix M. In general, could have a complicated structure unrelated to and it is not necessarily the case that the membership test can always be done in polynomial time. However, in many cases of interest, the test could be performed efficiently, for example, when is a threshold structure, or more generally when is the complement of the access structure of any polynomial-sized linear secret-sharing scheme.
Efficient decoding for general adversary structures
The high storage requirement of Scheme 1 is something of a drawback. We now consider some ways in which this storage can be substantially reduced.
Reducing the number of level 2 schemes required
In Kurosawa's scheme, each element of the level 1 share vector was re-shared using a separate level 2 scheme. However, this is not strictly necessary: the level 2 schemes are used only to identify uncorrupted level 1 shares, so we simply need to guarantee that we can always find an authorised set whose shares are confirmed to be uncorrupted. The next lemma determines when we can restrict the level 2 shares to a subset of participants A.
Lemma 1 Let A ⊆ S be the set of users whose level 1 shares are shared among the members of S by means of a level 2 scheme. Then the decoding method of Scheme 1 succeeds provided that set A has the property that for all W ⊆ A with W ∈ we have A \ W ∈ . (We will refer to any set with this property as a decoding set.)
Proof The set of participants in A whose shares are corrupted by a coalition is of the form A ∩ W for some W ∈ . The level 1 shares possessed by users in A \ W will be designated as uncorrupted by the decoding algorithm of Scheme 1, since their secret vectors w are unaffected, and their level 2 shares are only corrupted in positions corresponding to users in W. Thus if A \ W ∈ then there exists an authorised set of participants whose shares are known to be uncorrupted, which can thus be used to recover the desired secret.
Note that in the case where there exists some W ∈ such that A \ W / ∈ , then the shares of users in A \ W do not suffice to recover the secret and the decoding algorithm of Scheme 1 fails.
If we wish to minimise the number of level 2 schemes required, it suffices to choose a decoding set A for which |{i|ϕ(i) ∈ A}| is minimised. For ideal schemes we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2 If (M, ϕ) is an ideal -error decodable secret-sharing scheme then the number of level 2 schemes required for successful instantiation of Scheme 1 is upper bounded by
1 + max W∈ |W| + max B∈ c
|B|.
Proof If 1 + max W∈ |W| + max B∈ c |B| ≥ |S| then the result is trivially true. Suppose otherwise, and let A ⊂ S be a set of size 1 + max W∈ |W| + max B∈ c |B|. For any set W ∈ , we have that |A \ W| ≥ 1 + max B∈ c |B|, so A \ W is not in c , and hence is a qualified set. Thus A is a decoding set, and the result follows.
For many combinations of and this represents a substantial saving, as illustrated by the following examples.
Example 4 Suppose is a (k, n)-threshold access structure for a set S of participants, and is an adversary structure consisting of all subsets of S of size at most t. Kurosawa's scheme requires each participant to store at least 2t + w level 2 shares. However, if t shares out of any set of shares of size t + w are corrupted, then the remaining set of shares is an authorised set, thus it suffices for each participant to possess t + w level 2 shares.
Example 5 Suppose S consists of eight participants, and consider the access structure consisting of all subsets of S that contain one of the two-element subsets of S given by the edges of the graph depicted in Fig. 3 . If we wish to protect against adversaries consisting of single participants that corrupt their shares, it suffices to provide level 2 sharings of the secrets corresponding to participants 1, 2, 3 and 4 (for example) in order to ensure that the decoding algorithm of Scheme 1 succeeds. For, no matter which of these participants acts as an adversary, there exist two consecutively numbered participants within this set, and their shares can be used to recover the secret since they form an authorised set. This reduces the number of level 2 schemes by half relative to Kurosawa's technique.
Example 6
The scheme described in Example 5 can be generalised to one suitable for a set of n participants with an access structure defined by the graph consisting of a cycle on n vertices, and an adversary that compromises up to t shares, where 2t < n/2 . In this case it suffices to deploy level 2 sharings of the level 1 shares corresponding to 2t + 2 consecutive participants, rather than for all n participants.
Reducing the size of the level 2 shares
The role of the level 2 shares is not to enable recovery of the level 1 shares (since these are already possessed by the participants), but rather to authenticate the level 1 shares so as to determine whether they have been corrupted. Therefore, it may not be necessary to use the same scheme (M, ϕ) for the level 2 share distribution as was used in level 1. In particular, we have the following: Proof Consider a level 1 share belonging to user i that is shared by means of a level 2 scheme. If each set B ∈ c with the property that B ∪ {i} ∈ learns no information about that level 1 share then the perfectness of the level 1 scheme is not compromised. If the level 2 scheme satisfies property 1 then this will certainly hold.
Property 2 is necessary in order prevent a scenario analogous to that depicted in Fig. 1 : if a single corrupted share vector can be obtained from either of two different secrets by corrupting shares belonging to sets of participants in , then it is not possible to determine from the level 2 shares whether the corresponding level 1 share has been corrupted.
For many combinations of
and , there will be sets of participants that are neither in c , nor of the form S \ (W 1 ∪ W 2 ) for any W 1 , W 2 ∈ . Such sets do not have to be able to obtain the secret, but there is no actual need to restrict the amount of information they can obtain about the secret. Thus it is not necessary to use a perfect scheme for distributing the level 2 shares, which potentially allows us to use more efficient schemes. Recall that in a perfect secret sharing scheme, the size of each user's share must be at least as big as the size of the secret. For schemes that are not perfect, this bound does not apply [4] ; an example of this is given by the class of schemes known as ramp schemes: t 2 , n) -ramp scheme is a secret-sharing scheme in which any set of t 2 or more participants are able to recover the secret, yet any set of at most t 1 participants learns no information about the secret.
Example 7 Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme can be generalised to give a (t 1 , t 2 , n)-ramp scheme by defining the secret to consist of the coefficients of x i in a polynomial f of degree at most t 2 for i = 0, 1, . . . , t 2 − t 1 − 1, with shares generated as before (see Example 2) . Then any set of t 2 or more users can use interpolation of f to recover the secret, and for any set of fewer than t 1 users the space of possible secrets is not decreased. Note that this scheme allows the sizes of each share to be reduced by a factor of t 2 − t 1 relative to the size of the secret, when compared with a (t 2 , n)-threshold scheme [19] .
If we are applying the construction of Scheme 1 to an ideal secret-sharing scheme then letting t 1 be the maximum size of a set in c and t 2 be the minimum size of a set of the form S \ (W 1 ∪ W 2 ) with W 1 , W 2 ∈ , whenever t 1 < t 2 we can use a (t 1 , t 2 , n)-ramp scheme to distribute the level 2 shares. If t is the maximum size of a set in then we have t 2 ≥ n − 2t .
Example 8
Suppose is a (k, n)-threshold access structure for a set S of participants, and is an adversary structure consisting of all subsets of S of size at most t, for some t < k. A perfect secret-sharing scheme realising requires each user to store a share that is as least as big as the size of the secret s. However, from the above discussion we see that for the level 2 schemes in Scheme 1 it suffices to use a (k, t, n)-ramp scheme. Using the scheme described in Example 7 permits a reduction in the size of the level 2 shares by a factor of k − t relative to Kurosawa's scheme.
Example 9 Let (M, ϕ) be a -error decodable secret-sharing scheme where S, and are as defined in Example 5. Then the largest set in c contains four elements, since any set of five vertices in the graph depicted in Fig. 3 contains at least two that are connected by an edge. Furthermore, each set in has size at most 1, so the smallest subset of S of the form S \ (W 1 ∪ W 2 ) with W 1 , W 2 ∈ contains six elements. Thus we can use a (4, 6, 8)-ramp scheme (rather than the scheme (M, ϕ)) to distribute the level 2 shares. This requires at most half the storage of any perfect secret-sharing scheme realising . Combining this with the observations of Example 5, we see that we can reduce the storage required for the level 2 shares by at least a factor of four relative to Kurosawa's technique for this combination of and .
Example 10
Considering the generalisation of Example 9 to n participants and adversaries that corrupt up to t shares (as in Example 6), we note that the largest set in c has n/2 elements, and the smallest subset of the form S \ (W 1 ∪ W 2 ) with W 1 , W 2 ∈ contains n − 2t elements. Hence in this case we can use a (n − 2t, n/2 , n)-ramp scheme, thus cutting storage requirements by a factor of at least n/2 − 2t.
Secret sharing and perfectly secure message transmission
One application of error decodable secret-sharing schemes described by Kurosawa is the construction of one-round perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) schemes. First proposed by Dolev, Dwork, Waarts and Yung [10] , the one-round PSMT primitive is closely related to secret sharing, although the underlying scenario is somewhat different. In Section 5.1 we give basic definitions and existence results for one-round PSMT schemes for general adversary structures. In Section 5.2 we examine the connection between one-round PSMT and secret sharing in more detail. Finally, in Section 5.3 we explore the implications of our results on error decodable secret sharing for the construction of efficient PSMT schemes.
One-round PSMT for general adversary structures
Definition 9 A one-round (n, t)-PSMT scheme is an algorithm permitting a party A to transmit a message s to a party B by sending information over n channels such that -B can correctly recover s even if an adversary changes the information passing through up to t of those channels; -the adversary learns no information about s from the information that A sent over the compromised channels.
We will refer to the information v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ) that is sent over the n channels as an encoding of the message s. Dolev et al. showed that a 1-round (n, t)-PSMT scheme exists if and only if n ≥ 3t + 1. As was the case for secret sharing, this original definition involves a threshold adversary structure (although, in contrast, the adversary is assumed to be active). Desmedt, Wang and Burmester studied the generalisation of PSMT to schemes secure against an arbitrary montone adversary structure [9] . For the adversary structure , Desmedt et al. show that a one-round PSMT scheme is possible if and only if condition Q( , , ) holds; in the case where is a threshold access structure, this reduces to the result of Dolev et al.
As in the case of error decodable secret sharing, it is possible to generalise the definition of a one-round PSMT scheme further, by defining separately the adversary structures corresponding to active adversaries who can corrupt transmitted data, and passive adversaries who must be prevented from obtaining information about the message s:
Definition 10 Let and c be monotone adversary structures defined on a set S of size n, corresponding to n channels connecting a party A to a party B. A one-round ( , c )-PSMT is an algorithm permitting A to transmit a message s to B by sending information over the channels such that -B can correctly recover s even if an adversary changes the information passing through a subset W ∈ of the channels; -an adversary who eavesdrops on a subset D ∈ c of the channels learns no information about s from the information that A sent over the channels in D.
Such "mixed" adversary structures have previously been considered in the case secure multi-party computation [13] and verifiable secret sharing [11] . (However, note that our mixed adversaries are more general, in that we do not require that Proof For any monotone access structure there exists a secret-sharing scheme realising , and if condition Q( , , c ) is satisfied then any such secret-sharing scheme is -error decodable. In order to turn the secret-sharing scheme into a oneround ( , c )-PSMT scheme, the channels are identified with the participants in the secret-sharing scheme, and party A simply generates shares corresponding to the secret s, and sends each share over the appropriate channel. Then the shares sent along channels corresponding to a set in c do not leak any information about the secret, and party B can use a decoding algorithm for the secret-sharing scheme in order to recover s. Now suppose condition Q( , , c ) does not hold. The argument used in the first part of the proof of Theorem 1 does not make use of the fact that authorised sets of users can recover the secret, and hence can be directly applied in this PSMT context to show that unique recovery of the message is not always possible.
Combining Theorems 1 and 3 we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3 A one-round ( , c )-PSMT scheme exists if and only if there exists aerror decodable secret-sharing scheme realising the access structure .
Based on this result it would be tempting to conclude that one-round ( , c )-PSMT and -error decodable secret sharing for an access structure are one and the same; however, this is not quite the case. In the following section we investigate more closely the relationship between these two primitives.
Connecting one-round PSMT and secret sharing
We have seen in Corollary 3 that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a -error decodable secret-sharing scheme realising an access structure are exactly the same as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a ( , c )-PSMT scheme, and in the proof of Theorem 3 we saw that everyerror decodable secret-sharing scheme realising an access structure gives rise to a 
. Then the word v defined by
could arise from corruptions of either v 1 or v 2 , and hence B cannot recover a unique message.
Thus, for a ( , c )-PSMT scheme it must be the case that for any set of the form
, where W 1 , W 2 ∈ , the values corresponding to channels in T of any encoding of a message must uniquely determine that message.
Thus for a one-round ( , c )-PSMT scheme we see that the data sent on sets of channels in can be corrupted, the data sent on sets of channels in c should not yield any information about the message, and the data sent on sets of channels of the form S \ (W 1 ∪ W 2 ) with W 1 , W 2 ∈ permits the message to be recovered (prior to any corruption). However, there are no conditions placed on sets of channels that are neither in c nor of the form S \ (W 1 ∪ W 2 ) with W 1 , W 2 ∈ . This is in contrast to the case of -error decodable secret sharing, in which every set of participants that is not in c is an authorised set and hence must be able to reconstruct the secret (provided their shares are not corrupted). Combining Lemma 2 and Definition 10 we obtain the following theorem: A -error decodable secret-sharing scheme realising has the same (active) adversary structure and unauthorised sets, however it satisfies the extra condition of being a perfect secret-sharing scheme. This is thus the essential difference between the two primitives. We will see in Section 5.3.2 that this has significant implications for the amount of information that must be transmitted in such schemes.
Example 11
Suppose n ≥ 3t + 1. In a one-round (n, t)-PSMT scheme the data transmitted over any set of t or fewer channels must reveal no information about the message s. Furthermore, by Lemma 2, the data transmitted over any set of n − 2t or more channels must suffice to recover the secret. Thus, when interpreted as a secret-sharing scheme, a one-round (n, t)-PSMT scheme defines a (t, n − 2t, n)-ramp scheme. However, for and c consisting of all subsets of S of size t or less, the corresponding -error decodable secret-sharing scheme realising is a (t + 1, n)-threshold scheme.
Efficient one-round PSMT schemes
There are three significant aspects to the efficiency of a one-round PSMT scheme: the number of channels required, the amount of information transmitted through each channel, and the efficiency with which A can encode the message and B can recover it. We now consider how the above discussion casts light on each of these properties.
Number of channels required for one-round ( , c )-PSMT
The focus of Desmedt et al. when considering one-round PSMT was on minimising the total number of channels required to implement such a scheme [9] . In our more general setting we have the following result: [9] . The following corollary is easily derived.
Corollary 4 An upper bound on the minimum number of channels required for the successful implementation of one-round ( , c )-PSMT is given by
|B|.
In the case where and c both consist of sets of size at most t this reduces to the result, proven in [10] , that one-round (n, t)-PSMT is possible if and only if n ≥ 3t + 1.
Amount of information transmitted during one-round ( , c )-PSMT
The amount of communication required to carry out one-round ( , c )-PSMT is a significant factor affecting the practical performance of a scheme. It is often specified in terms of a quantity referred to as the overhead of the scheme [12] .
Definition 11
The overhead of a one-round ( , c )-PSMT scheme is defined to be the total amount of information transmitted over all the channels divided by the size of the message s.
The overhead of a one-round PSMT scheme is a direct consequence of the size of the shares in the corresponding secret-sharing scheme, although in the secretsharing literature it is usually described in terms of the average information rate, which is the size of the secret divided by the mean of the sizes of the shares. (Thus the overhead of a one-round PSMT scheme is equal to n times the reciprocal of the average information rate of the corresponding secret-sharing scheme.) The problem of minimising the information rate and/or the average information rate of a secretsharing scheme has received much attention in the secret-sharing literature. The fact that the secret-sharing schemes required for one-round PSMT do not necessarily have to be perfect can allow for additional savings to be made.
Example 12
In order to demonstrate that it is always possible to implement a PSMT scheme when Q( , , ) is satisfied, Desmedt et al. describe a construction that is equivalent to the construction in [17] for (perfect) secret-sharing schemes realising general access structures. Kurosawa points out that in the case of a threshold adversary, this results in the need to transmit considerably more information over each of the channels in T than if an ideal threshold scheme were used [20] , a result whose secret-sharing analogue is well-known (see [18] , for example). If an ideal threshold scheme is used then the resulting overhead is precisely n. However, it is possible to do better than this, as illustrated by the following corollary to Theorem 4, which re-proves a result that appears in [12] .
Corollary 5 The optimal overhead of a one-round (n, t)-PSMT scheme is n/(n − 3t).
Proof As we observed in Example 11 a one-round (n, t)-PSMT scheme, is precisely a (t, n − 2t, n)-ramp scheme. The ramp scheme described in Example 7 leads to shares whose size is 1/((n − 2t) − t) times the size of the secret, which is known to be optimal [19] ; the result follows directly.
For scenarios in which the cost of communication is substantial relative to the cost of computation for user B, when constructing a one-round PSMT scheme it may suffice to choose the most efficient secret-sharing scheme known for the appropriate access structure. However, in general we have also to consider the computational effort required for B to recover the message. We address this question in Section 5.3.3.
One-round ( , c )-PSMT with ef f icient message recovery
In the case of PSMT based on Reed-Solomon codes, the efficient decoding algorithms that exist for such codes provide a means for B to recover the message transmitted by A. However, for adversary structures other than the threshold structure, it is not necessarily known whether there exists a corresponding PSMT scheme with efficient message recovery (this issue was not considered in [9] ). The construction in Scheme 1 of efficiently decodable -error decodable secretsharing schemes shows that one-round ( , c )-PSMT with polynomial time message recovery (that is, polynomial in the number of channels) is possible provided condition Q( , , c ) holds and can be realised by a secret-sharing scheme (M, ϕ) for which l is polynomial in n. We observe that the conditions placed on the level 2 schemes in Theorem 2 are equivalent to requiring them to be one-round ( , c )-PSMT schemes. For the purpose of constructing one-round ( , c )-PSMT schemes we can relax the conditions on the level 1 scheme to allow it to be a one-round ( , c )-PSMT scheme also (rather than requiring a -error decodable secret-sharing scheme). However, it is not clear whether in general this will lead to schemes with smaller overhead: whereas the size of the level 1 shares may be reduced, since the size of the minimal authorised sets in the level 1 scheme is potentially increased, the required number of level 2 schemes may increase.
It would be of interest to determine whether there exist general constructions for one-round ( , c )-PSMT schemes with polynomial time message recovery with communication overheads lower than those achieved by our modified version of Scheme 1, or whether efficient decoding techniques can be found for specific classes of adversary structures.
Conclusion
We have seen that the concept of error decodable secret sharing leads to useful insight into the construction of one-round PSMT schemes for general adversary structures, providing a link between one-round PSMT and the existing literature on secret-sharing. We have noted the need to consider the efficiency of message recovery when considering one-round PSMT with general adversaries, and we have shown that Kurosawa's scheme for constructing efficiently decodable secret-sharing schemes can be modified to give one-round ( , c )-PSMT schemes with a better trade-off between the efficiency of message recovery and the amount of information transmitted. We are left with the following open questions:
-Do there exist constructions of one-round ( , c )-PSMT schemes with polynomial time message recovery for general , with lower communication overheads than those obtained by the modifications to Scheme 1? -Is it possible to determine in general which classes of and can be realised by schemes with efficient decoding/message recovery? -Is it possible to find efficient decoding/message recovery techniques for specific classes of and ?
